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Utilitarian Generalization (UG) is the theory that an act is right if  and only if 
the consequences of everyone's performing that sort of action would be at 
least as good as the consequences of everyone's performing any alternative sort 
of action. A standard issue raised by the theory is how we specify what 'sort '  an 
action is for purposes of  applying the theory. According to David Lyons, the 
action's 'sort' is determined by all and only its 'consequentially significant' 
properties, i.e., those in virtue of which it produces utilities or disutilitiesJ 
This implies that in certain cases the action's sort must refer to the activities 
of  other agents, for they form an important part of the action's circum- 
stances which contribute to the production of its consequences. 
In applying UG, one must determine what the consequences would be of 
everyone's performing acts of the relevant sort; this in turn requires one to 
determine how many agents will have the opportunity to perform acts of  this 
sor t )  But, as Sobel and Silverstein have pointed out, the question 'How 
many agents can perform acts of type A ?' can be interpreted in two different 
ways. 3 On the more natural distributive interpretation, the question means 
'How many agents will have as individuals the opportunity to perform an act 
of  type A ?' Since there are insurmountable difficulties with the theory on 
this interpretation, these investigators have urged a second, or collective, inter- 
pretation, according to which the question means 'How many agents can 
perform acts of type A collectively or together?' Clearly the answers to these 
two questions are different, for, when two people pass each other on the 
street without saying anything, both have the opportunity as individuals to be 
the only one to say 'hello ', but it is possible for only one of them to perform 
this act when they are viewed as a collectivity. 
In a previous paper I argued that the distributive version of UG (on a 
Lyons-type interpretation) cannot be used by agents as an action-guide, since 
in many cases an agent who attempts to use it in deciding whether or not to 
perform an act of type A cannot determine how many agents will have the 
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opportunity to perform acts of type A without taking into account whether 
or not he himself is going to perform that act. 4 Since an action-guide cannot 
require an agent to employ information that he will actually perform a given 
act in deciding whether or not to perform it, this is a grave defect in UG. The 
following case shows how the problem arises. Smith, Jones, and Brown are 
voting on a certain issue on which the majority rules. Smith and Jones will 
vote 'no',  and Brown is attempting to use UG in deciding whether or not to 
vote 'yes'. His choice is represented in the following diagram: 
Utility o f  
Smith Jones Brown Total Consequences 
n o  n o  yes  3 
no no n o  3 
Brown's act of voting 'yes' must be described, according to Lyons' criterion, 
as an act of  voting ~/es' in a context where two 'no' votes are cast and where 
two 'no' votes are sufficient to ensure a utility of 3. Let us call this an act of 
type Y. How many agents have the opportunity (distributively) to perform an 
act of type Y? The answer is indeterminate unless we include information 
about how Brown himself votes: for if he votes ~/es', then only one person, 
himself, actually has this opportunity, whereas if he votes 'no', then all three 
agents have the opportunity (each could vote 'yes' in a context where two 'no' 
votes are cast). Brown cannot use UG in deciding what to do, since he cannot 
calculate the consequences of everyone's performing an act of type Y unless 
he knows what he himself will do. 
Silverstein has argued that the collective interpretation of UG avoids this 
problem, s On this interpretation, if Brown votes 'yes', then only one person 
can (in the collective sense) perform an act of type Y (i.e., Brown). But it is 
also true that if Brown votes 'no' then only one person can (in the collective 
sense) perform an act of type Y - three may have this opportunity as indivi- 
duals, but it is collectively possible for at most one of them to carry it out. 
Thus the number of agents with this collective opportunity is invariant with 
respect to Brown's own actions, and he need not Use information about him- 
self in making his decision. 
However, Silverstein fails to notice that this argument does not hold for 
every possible act type. Let us focus on Brown's voting 'no',  which must be 
described as "voting 'no' in a context where two other 'no' votes are cast and 
where two 'no' votes are sufficient to ensure a utility of 3". How many agents 
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have the collective opportunity to perform an act of this type, type N?  If 
Brown himself votes 'yes', then he is the only one with this opportunity,  
since he is the only one whose circumstances include the casting of two 'no '  
votes. But if he votes 'no '  himself, then all three agents have this collective 
opportunity,  as evidenced by the fact that all three actually perform acts of 
this sort! Thus the number of agents who have the collective opportunity to 
perform an act of  type N does vary with Brown's actual choice. Once again 
we discover that UG, even on the collective interpretation, cannot be used as 
an action guide. The only recourse seems to be deleting reference to the 
actions of others in specifying the 'sort' of the act under consideration. 
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